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REIMBURSEMENT OF PUBLIC INTERVENORS
In Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v.
FCC,' the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held
that the FCC must permit voluntary reimbursement of the legiti-
mate and prudent expenses of bona fide public-interest groups who
withdraw petitions to deny renewal of a broadcast license when-
ever such withdrawal serves the public interest. The controversy
arose in 1969, when the Texarkana Junior Chamber of Commerce
and eleven other local groups, assisted by the Church of Christ,
filed a petition under section 309(d) of the Communications Act2
opposing the renewal of television station KTAL's broadcast li-
cense.' Subsequent to the filing of this petition, the local groups
and KTAL management reached an agreement whereby the local
groups would withdraw their petition to deny relicensing and, in re-
turn, the station would make certain specified changes in its opera-
tions and policies.4 The station also agreed that if the Commission
granted renewal of its license pursuant to this agreement, the station
would, subject to further Commission approval, voluntarily reim-
burse the petitioners for the expenses incurred in prosecuting the
petition to deny. Relying upon the parties' agreement, the FCC
renewed KTAL's license. Thereafter, the Office of Communication
of the United Church of Christ, which had provided legal advice
and other support to the local groups, filed a request with the FCC
for approval of the parties' supplementary reimbursement agreement.
1. 465 F.2d 519 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
2. 47 U.S.C. § 309(d) (1970).
3. The local groups charged, inter alia, that KTAL-TV had failed to serve
the needs of the community, particularly those of the black viewing audience;
that KTAL had not contacted any black leaders in its survey of community needs;
and that the station neither presented public announcements for black groups nor
invited minority groups to discuss issues on its public affairs shows. For a full
statement of petitioner's grievances, see KCMC, Inc., 19 F.C.C.2d 109, 113, 16 P &
F RADIO REG. 2D 1067, 1072 (1969).
4. KTAL promised, inter alia, (1) to employ a minimum of two full-time
black reporters; (2) to maintain a full-time operator to answer a toll-free tele-
phone; (3) to assign a color camera to its Texarkana studio; and (4) to consult
monthly with all community leaders. For a complete statement of the terms of the
agreement, see id. at 120-22, 16 P & F RADIo Run. 2D at 1079-81.
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The Commission, however, refused to approve this aspect of the
compromise and decided that "in no petition to deny situation, what-
ever the nature of the petitioner, will we permit payment of ex-
penses . . . ."I On appeal by the Office of Communication, the
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit rejected the
Commission's absolute bar and remanded for reconsideration of
whether the expenses were "legitimate and prudent."'
The Communications Act of 19347 created the Federal Com-
munications Commission to regulate the use of the airwaves for the
public benefit. The Act established, inter alia, a system for the li-
censing of radio and television stations. The FCC, in accordance
with its statutory mandate, may grant an initial or renewal license
only if "the public interest, convenience, and necessity will be served
by the granting of such application . . . ."8 These licenses are
granted for a maximum of three years9 and may be renewed by
application to and upon approval by the Commission. ° Pursuant
to section 309(d) of the Act, however, "any party in interest may
file with the Commission a petition to deny any application. .. .
Thereafter, if the Commission determines that a "substantial and ma-
terial question of fact is presented" or that it is presently unable to
make the finding that granting the application would serve the pub-
lic interest, a hearing on the matter is scheduled.1 2 Section 311(c),
the only provision of the Act which explicitly deals with reimburse-
ment, covers the specialized case of multiple applications for a
single new broadcast facility construction permit. This section, en-
acted as an amendment to the Communications Act, establishes a
minimal procedure that the Commission must follow before it can ap-
prove the withdrawal and reimbursement of any applicant."3 While
the Act does not expressly deal with other specific situations in
which reimbursement agreements may arise-including the with-
drawal and voluntary reimbursement of petitioners to deny-the
5. KCMC, Inc., 25 F.C.C.2d 603, 605, 20 P & F RADIO RE. 2D 267, 269
(1970).
6. 465 F.2d at 528. See note 41 infra.
7. 47 U.S.C. §§ 151-609 (1970) (originally enacted as Act of June 19, 1934,
ch. 652, 48 Stat. 1064).
8. Id. § 309(a).
9. Id. § 307(d).
10. Id.
11. Id. § 309(d)(1).
12. Id. § 309(e).




FCC is vested with sufficiently broad discretionary powers which
encompass such problems. 4 Exercising its discretionary powers to
deal with withdrawal and reimbursement agreements,'- the Commis-
sion had continued to consider reimbursement agreements not ex-
plicitly included within the statutory language subsequent to the en-
actment of section 311(c). 16 The Commission concluded that sec-
tion 311(c) sought only to eliminate specific abuses that had arisen
in the context of multiple original license applicants and thus did not
mandate an absolute bar against other reimbursement situations. 7
In these non-section 311(c) cases, the Commission had held that
the "spirit" of section 311(c) applied and had occasionally approved
withdrawal and reimbursement agreements which terminated litiga-
tion if it found the public interest was thus served. 8
Withdrawal and reimbursement agreements ordinarily fall into
two categories.' 9  The first and most common category-multiple
applicants for a new construction permit-is resolved by the specific
14. The Commission may "perform any and all acts, make such rules and
regulations... not inconsistent with this chapter as may be necessary in the execu-
tion of its function." Id. § 154(i). The Commission also is empowered to pre-
scribe "such ... restrictions and conditions ... as may be necessary ..
Id. § 303(r).
15. The Commission has consistently utilized the public interest standard to
determine whether a reimbursement agreement should be approved. As an illus-
tration of this public interest standard, mandated by § 309(a) of the Communica-
tions Act, the Commission recently indicated that "in deciding whether to approve a
withdrawal [-reimbursement] agreement between competing applicants, benefits and
detriments to the public interest must be weighed." WFMY Television Corp., 33
F.C.C.2d 857, 23 P & F RADIo REG. 2D 1032, 1033 (1972). Accord, Seven
League Prod., Inc., 7 F.C.C.2d 513, 514, 9 P & F RADIo REG. 2D 773, 775 (1967);
National Broadcasting Co., 25 P & F RADio ERG. 67, 72 (1963).
16. See, e.g., Woma Typa Broadcasting Co., 1 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 323 (1963);
Capital Broadcasting Corp., 3 F.C.C.2d 285, 7 P & F RADIO REo. 2D 226 (Rev.
Bd. 1966).
17. "The inapplicability of section 311(c) does not mean ... [that] the
Commission has no authority to pass upon the joint petition in this case." Na-
tional Broadcasting Co., 25 P & F RADIo REG. 67, 71 (1963). See note 26 infra.
18. National Broadcasting Co., 25 P & F RADIo REG. 67, 71 (1963); see
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 465 F.2d 519,
525-27 (D.C. Cir. 1972). See notes 28-30 infra and accompanying text.
19. A third type of case-reimbursement of public advisory gfoups to broadcast
stations-has recently come before the FCC. The Commission refused to allow the
station to reimburse the advisory group for sums expended in fulfilling its duties.
However, the Commission also decided that the problem was "troublesome" and
ordered a Notice of Inquiry to investigate this situation. Strauss Broadcasting Co.,
31 F.C.C.2d 550, 22 P & F RADIo REm. 2D 806 (1971). This investigation will
consider the feasibility of a rule to deal with reimbursement situations, involving
petitioners to deny and local advisory groups. 37 Fed. Reg. 11592 (1972).
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language of section 311(c). The FCC has often approved with-
drawal and reimbursement agreements of this category, 20 determining
that the obvious public benefits (such as the early institution or resto-
ration of broadcast service in an area without the delay of a long
and expensive comparative hearing) outweighs the public detriment
of losing the choice between two competing applicants. 21  The Com-
mission has refused, however, to approve such settlements if:
unresolved questions concerning (1) the character qualifications of
either applicant,22 (2) misrepresentations or other abuses of the
Commission's processes, 23 (3) financial or legal qualifications, 24
or (4) the good faith filing of an application 25 remain outstanding.
The second category of withdrawal and reimbursement agreement
concerns an applicant for a construction permit and a license re-
newal applicant. Although the Communications Act does not deal
explicitly with reimbursement agreements of this category, the FCC
has found authority to approve or disapprove such agreements un-
der its public-interest standard.26 But the Commission has also
20. In all reimbursement agreement cases, the withdrawal of an application pur-
suant to the reimbursement agreement can be "consistent with the public interest,
convenience, or necessity only if the amount or value of such payment, as deter-
mined by the Commission, . .. [has] been legitimately and prudently expended.
* . ." Grand Broadcasting Co., 5 P & F RADIo REG. 2D 527, 529 (1965). See
National Broadcasting Co., 24 F.C.C.2d 218, 219-20, 19 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 634,
635-36 (1970); National Broadcasting Co., 25 P & F RADIO REG. 67, 72 (1963).
21. See, e.g., Alkima Broadcasting Co., 35 F.C.C. 635, 1 P & F RADIO REG. 2D
612 (1963); Broadcasting Service, Inc., 22 F.C.C.2d 1, 18 P & F RADIO RE. 2D
673 (Rev. Bd. 1970); American Colonial Broadcasting Corp., 8 P & F RADIO REG.
2D 657 (Rev. Bd. 1966); Tri-Cities Broadcasting Co., 6 P & F RADIO REG. 2D I
(Rev. Bd. 1965); Rockland Broadcasting Co., 3 P & F RADIO REG. 2 553 (Rev.
Bd. 1964).
22. See, e.g., People's Broadcasting Co., 8 F.C.C.2d 749, 10 P & F RADIO
REG. 2D 592 (1967); Publix Television Corp., 33 F.C.C. 98, 23 P & F RADIO REo.
856 (1962); 1400 Corp., 11 F.C.C.2d 575, 12 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 302 (Rev.
Bd. 1968).
23. See, e.g., John A. Egle, 1 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 344 (1963); Clay County
Broadcasting Co., 7 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 560 (Rev. Bd. 1966); Tri-Cities Broad-
casting Co., 6 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 1 (Rev. Bd. 1965).
24. See, e.g., Clay County Broadcasting Co., 7 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 560 (Rev.
Bd. 1966); Tri-Cities Broadcasting Co., 6 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 1 (Rev. Bd. 1965).
25. See, e.g., Charles County Broadcasting Co., 3 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 915
(Rev. Bd. 1964).
26. In the landmark decision dealing with the question of the Commission's
power to approve or disapprove non-section 311(c) reimbursement agreements, the
Commission said:
In our view, § 311(c) did not bestow upon the Commission new authority
to act in this field; it simply made clear that the Commission must pass on
withdrawal agreements involving applications for construction permits, that
it shall approve the agreements only if it determines it to be consistent with
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stressed, however, that "barring extraordinary circumstances, the
challenger to a renewal [an applicant for a construction permit]
cannot be reimbursed in any amount for his expenditures in pre-
paring and prosecuting his application .... "27 Since the benefit of
immediate inauguration of a new broadcast service found in the first
factual pattern is absent here, and since the present broadcast ser-
vice continues while the choice between competing applicants is
made, the Commission has ordinarily held that the deteriment of losing
a choice between competing applicants outweighs the benefits to the
public .2  Nevertheless, even in this factual matrix, the Commis-
sion has occasionally found those "extraordinary circumstances" and
has approved withdrawal and reimbursement agreements. For ex-
ample, in Seven League Production, Inc.,29 the Commission approved
a withdrawal and reimbursement agreement even though the public
would be deprived of a choice between competing applicants.30 The
the public interest and that the Commission may determine an agreement
to be consistent with the public interest only if it does not entail payment
in excess of "legitimate and prudent expenses." National Broadcasting Co.,
25 P & F RADIo REG. 67,72 (1963).
The Commission had stated earlier that:
[the inapplicability, in terms, of 311(c) does not mean . . .the Com-
mission has no authority to pass upon the [reimbursement] agreement in
this case. The Commission has, we think, full authority to do so under
the public interest standard. Id. at 71.
Prior to the enactment of section 311(c) the Commission had also approved reim-
bursement agreements. Premier Television, Inc., 17 F.C.C. 783 (1953). The
majority of non-section 311(c) reimbursement cases involve withdrawing appli-
cants in challenger-renewal situations. See, e.g., Woma Typa Broadcasting Co., 1
P & F RADIo REG. 2) 323 (1963); Capital Broadcasting Corp., 3 F.C.C.2d 285,
7 P & F RADIO REG. 2 226 (Rev. Bd. 1966).
There are a few situations in which the Commission has ruled on other types
of reimbursement agreements. See, e.g., Strauss Broadcasting, Inc., 31 F.C.C.2d 550,
22 P & F RADIo REG. 2D 806 (1971) (the Commission ruled on a reimbursement
agreement between a station and a public advisory group); Telegraph-Herald, Inc.,
21 F.C.C.2d 974, 18 P & F RADIo REG. 2D 708 (Rev. Bd. 1970) (a reimbursement
agreement which would expedite the inauguration of a new "DPLMR" service ap-
proved).
27. Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearing Involving Regular Re-
newal Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424, 429 n.7, 18 P & F RADio REG. 2 1901, 1908 n.7
(1970), invalidated on other grounds, Citizens Communications Center v. FCC,
447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
28. See, e.g., WFMY Television Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d 857, 23 P & F RADIO REG.
21 1032 (1972); Cragin Broadcasting, 9 F.C.C.2d 687, 10 P & F RADIo REG. 21
1112 (1967); Woma Typa Broadcasting Co., 1 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 323 (1963);
National Broadcasting Co., 25 P & F RADIo REG. 67 (1963); WMGS, Inc., 10 F.C.C.
2d 169, 11 P & F RADIO REG. 2D 351 (Rev. Bd. 1967).
29. 7 F.C.C.2d 513, 9 P & F RADIo REG. 21)773 (1967).
30. Id. Accord, Blue Island Community Broadcasting Co., 1 F.C.C.2d 629,
6P&FRAmo REG. 2 136 (1965).
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countervailing public benefits were the elimination of all questions
concerning the financial viability of the station and the fact that the
new licensee would be comprised of distinguished local citizens.8
Although it properly applied a reduced standard of judicial
review, 2 the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit
nevertheless found it necessary to overrule the Commission's abso-
lute bar against voluntary reimbursement of withdrawing petitioners
to deny..3  The court concluded that the following policy is em-
bodied in the Communications Act: "reimbursement which facili-
tates withdrawal of competing or conflicting petitions is definitely in
the public interest when termination of the litigation serves an over-
riding public interest goal. ' 34  The court also reflected upon the
Commission's willingness to consider reimbursement in non-peti-
tioner to deny situations subsequent to the passage of section 311
(c)3 5 and found it "inexplicable that the Commission should reject
the 'spirit' of § 311(c) and its own line of cases in order to raise an
absolute bar against reimbursement in all petitions to deny situa-
tions. '36 The court noted that the majority of the Commission in
erecting an absolute bar to voluntary reimbursement of withdraw-
ing petitioners to deny, mentioned only two potential abuses: first,
the terms of a settlement on the merits might be influenced by the
31. Id. 7 FC.C.2d 513, 514, 9 P & F RADIoREG. 2D 773, 775 (1967).
The Commission has also approved reimbursement when the withdrawing party
filed his application in reliance upon a confusing FCC decision subsequently clari-
fied to the detriment of the challenger. National Broadcasting Co., 24 F.C.C.2d 218,
219, 19 P & F RADio REG. 2D 634, 635 (1970). Accord, Post-Newsweek Stations,
Inc., 26 F.C.C.2d 982, 20 P & F RADIo REo. 2D 730 (Rev. Bd. 1970).
However, the FCC has recently indicated that it will take a more restrictive
attitude toward the granting of reimbursement, and disallowed a request on this
ground. WFMY Television Corp., 33 F.C.C.2d 857, 23 P & F RADIo REo. 2D 1032
(1972). On this question the Commission stated:
We did waive the policy [of denying reimbursement in a case involving
a construction permit applicant and license renewal applicant] in the unu-
sual circumstances of the 1970 National Broadcasting Co., and Post-News-
week cases. We do not now hold that this area is settled in all respects.
... . It may be a considerable period of time before all significant as-
pects of policy in the field are settled. Id. at 860, 23 P & F RADIo REo. 2D
at 1035.
32. "The Commission's construction of its own statutory mandate 'should be
followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong."' Office of Com-
munication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 465 F.2d 519, 524 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
33. Id. at 520.
34. Id. at 524-25.
35. Id. at 525-26. See notes 15-16 supra and accompanying text.
36. Id. at 527.
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ability to obtain reimbursement of expenses from the licensee; sec-
ond, allowing reimbursement might encourage opportunists to file
frivolous or unsubstantial petitions.37  The court found this reason-
ing unpersuasive, since these abuses had not occurred in Church of
Christ and the Commission had given no reason why the potential
for abuse of voluntary reimbursement in the petition to deny situation
was any greater than in any other reimbursement situation.38 Fur-
thermore, the FCC had found obvious benefits to the public interest
in allowing withdrawal of petitioners to deny in certain situations.
The Commission had written, as paraphrased by the court, that:
"[The settlement of the issues between the station and the petition-
ing group is generally a desirable goal" because it promotes an at-
mosphere of "generous cooperation-not strife and suspicion" and
"should prove to be more effective in improving local service than
would be the imposition of strict guidelines by the Commission."39
The court also found that by allowing reimbursement of withdraw-
ing petitioners, public participation in decisions which involve the
public interest would be encouraged.4 0 In remanding to the agency, 4'
the court admonished the Commission that public participation is
viewed increasingly as "not only valuable, but indispensable."42
In order to assess the reasoning and impact of this decision, it
is necessary to examine the evolving triangular relationship between
the FCC, the licensee, and the petitioners to deny. Unlike a judicial
proceeding where an impartial court decides which of two diametri-
cally opposed parties will prevail, this triangular relationship pre-
sents a community of interest with each party seeking different but
not incompatible goals: the licensee seeks to have his license renewed
so that he can continue broadcasting and making profits; the pe-
titioners desire a change in the licensee's broadcasting policies and/or
operation; and the FCC wants a broadcasting service that will best
serve the public interest. However, unlike a judicial proceeding
37. Id. at 522.
38. Id. at 527.
39. Id. at 526-27.
40. Id. at 527-28.
41. The case was remanded for the FCC to determine if the expenses sought by
the Office of Communication were legitimate and prudent under the standard of
section 311(c). On remand, the Commission found the expenses were legitimate
and prudent and approved the entire sum ($15,000) requested by the Office. The
Commission, however, limited its decision to the facts present in the instant case.
KCMC, Inc., 35 F.C.C.2d 240, 242, 24 P & F RADIo REi. 2D 575, 577 (1972).
42. 465 F.2d at 527.
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where the two parties often can compromise and conclusively settle
their dispute without obtaining court approval, the petitioners and
the licensee still must convince the interested third party, the Com-
mission, that the granting of a renewal license pursuant to the prior
agreement will serve the public interest.43
The Church of Christ court was convinced that the role of the
Commission would effectively insure that any agreement reached
would advance the public interest. Once this paramount interest was
assured, the court concluded that a voluntary agreement of reim-
bursement presented no greater danger of abuse between petitioner
and licensee than similar agreements which the Commission occa-
sionally allows in challenger-licensee situations.44 An analysis
of the dual abuses, which the FCC believed would stem from allow-
ing voluntary reimbursement, readily illustrates the correctness of
the court's contention.
The first potential danger is that the settlement terms might be
influenced by the ability to obtain a voluntary agreement for reim-
bursement. 45 It is widely recognized that inadequate financial re-
sources is a matter of major practical concern to local groups consid-
ering the filing of a petition to deny.46 The court's reasoning-allow-
ing voluntary reimbursement will encourage greater public par-
ticipation in the license renewal process 47--is an implicit admission
that local groups will be somewhat reluctant to engage in the pro-
cess if they would thereby incur non-reimbursable expense. How-
ever, once such groups enter into the process, the possibility unde-
niably exists that they might bargain away some objectives in re-
turn for a voluntary agreement to reimburse. Nevertheless, as anal-
ogous reimbursement cases involving challengers or competitors
demonstrate, the Commission has been willing to inquire into the mer-
its of any settlement,'4 and the mere possibility of coercive compro-
mise need not and has not deterred the Commission from approving
43. For a discussion of the merits of this triangular model of citizen participa-
tion in the license renewal process, see Note, The Texarkana Agreement as a
Model Strategy for Citizen Participation in FCC License Renewals, 7 HAv. J.
LEois. 627 (1970).
44. See, e.g., Capital Broadcasting Corp., 3 F.C.C.2d 285, 7 P & F RADio REO.
2D 226 (Rev. Bd. 1966). See notes 29-30 supra and accompanying text.
45. 465 F.2d at 522.
46. See Note, supra note 43, at 634.
47. 465 F.2d at 527-28. See note 40 supra and accompanying text.
48. See cases cited in note 25 supra.
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settlements after inquiry has revealed that the public interest would
be served.49
The Commission's conduct in non-petitioner situations under-
scores the anomalous character of its decision to erect an absolute
bar against reimbursement of petitioners. Lacking the resources to
conduct in-depth investigations into the particular needs of each
community, the FCC by necessity has left this task to local groups.50
The Commission has indicated that it desires
licensees to meet with community oriented groups to settle complaints
of local broadcast service. Such cooperation at the community
level should prove to be more effective in improving local service
than would be the imposition of strict guidelines by the Commission.51
Despite the Commission's objections, this policy of encouragement
will be facilitated by the court's holding that "legitimate and pru-
dent" expenses of local groups may be assumed voluntarily by the li-
censee. The local groups will not only be more willing to enter into
the relicensing process, but they can also provide an additional ben-
efit which is only hinted at by the Commission's statement: the
continuous monitoring of a relicensee to insure compliance with the
settlement. 2 Thus, allowing voluntary reimbursement will strengthen
the triangular relationship in the relicensing process by encouraging
entry of the public and providing a greater probability of increased
and continuous scrutiny of the relicensee's performance.53
The second serious abuse feared by the Commission was the
filing of insubstantial or frivolous petitions to deny.54 As the court
pointed out, however, this possibility exists to some degree in all re-
licensing controversies.55 To mitigate this problem in the petitioner
situation, it becomes essential that the licensee be able to assess ac-
49. See cases cited in note 25 supra. The Commission's mandate to further
the public interest would be violated only if a specific agreement was not in the
public interest. The mere possibility that a settlement was reached through a coer-
cive compromise on substantive issues is not, of and in itself, against the public in-
terest.
50. See Note, supra note 43, at 638.
51. KCMC, Inc., 19 F.C.C.2d 109, 16 P & F RAnio REG. 2D 1067, 1068 (1969).
52. The "cooperation" which the Commission sought, see text accompanying
note 51 supra, would "prove more effective in improving local service" if predicated
on the realization that the licensee's day-to-day performance was being utilized as a
measuring stick, instead of viewing his cumulative performance at the end of the
license period. See note 60 infra.
53. See note 50 supra, and accompanying text.
54. 465 F.2d at 522.
55. Id. at 525.
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curately the substantiality of the charges leveled in the petition. With
the threat of relicensing denial ever present, a licensee is likely to
negotiate any issues which tend to appear substantial and, further, to
offer reimbursement as an added incentive for settlement. To clar-
ify the bargaining position of the licensee, the Commission must out-
line with reasonable precision which issues will be deemed substan-
tial and present a real threat to license renewal. Because of the
complexity of this area, clarification of some issues may realisti-
cally only be attainable through adjudication. However, within cer-
tain broad categories, the FCC has defined characteristics and stand-
ards to which competing applicants for an initial license must con-
form;56 there is no reason to believe that the Commission is inca-
pable of clarifying the renewal area as well. Even though absolute
clarification may never be obtained, the licensee can be aided suffi-
ciently to enable him to avoid engaging in needless bargaining over
insubstantial issues.57
Beyond the resolution of the specific voluntary reimbursement
issue,5s Church of Christ significantly demonstrates the existence of
56. In Policy Statement on Comparative Broadcast Hearings, 1 F.C.C.2d 393,
5 P & F RADIo REG. 2D 1901 (1965), the Commission attempted to state the factors
to consider when choosing between competing applicants for an initial broadcast
license. The Commission said:
The hearing and decision process is inherently complex, and the subject
does not lend itself to precise categorization .... The various factors
cannot be assigned absolute values, some factors may be present in some
cases and not in others, and the differences between applicants with re-
spect to each factor are almost infinitely variable.
Furthermore, membership on the Commission is not static and the
views of individual Commissioners on the importance of particular factors
may change....
All this being so, it is nonetheless important to have a high degree of
consistency of decision and of clarity in our basic policies....
This statement is issued to serve the purpose of clarity and consis-
tency of decision .... We recognize, of course, that a general statement
cannot dispose of all problems or decide cases in advance .... Difficult
cases will remain difficult. Id. at 393-94.
However, the Commission listed factors such as diversification of control of the
media, proposed program service, character, in the order of weight to be given each.
While, of course, borderline and yet substantial questions will remain in any complex
area, the same clarification of what will be considered a substantial issue in the
petition-to-deny situation should be attainable after adjudication of diverse factual
situations.
57. The promulgation of clarified standards would enable monitoring local
groups to identify substantial failings in the performance of the licensee more easily.
58. An issue not reached by the Church of Christ court was whether a relicen-
see could be ordered to reimburse a petitioner, in the absence of an agreement to do
so, after a settlement had been agreed upon by the parties and approved by the FCC.
See 465 F.2d at 528 & n.38. The Commission, subsequent to its Church of Christ
decision but prior to the court's reversal, had declined to order involuntary reim-
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a continuing, fundamental disagreement between the D.C. Circuit
and the FCC. On the one hand, the Commission has chosen to in-
crease the "stability" of the broadcast industry by limiting, at the li-
cense renewal stage, the circumstances under which a licensee's ap-
plication for relicensing can effectively be challenged,5 9 whether by
competitors60 or petitioners to deny.61 On the other hand, the courts
bursement. Radio Station WSNT, Inc., 31 F.C.C.2d 1080, 23 P & F RADIO REG. 2D
53 (1971). See note 30 supra.
It seems clear that the salutary effects the court found in the increased avail-
ability of reimbursement would in no way be diminished by a lack of voluntariness.
In fact, eliminating the hurdle of obtaining a voluntary agreement would substan-
tially reduce any possibility of coercive settlements, further stimulate the desire of
local groups to enter the relicensing process, and probably have the beneficial effect
of speeding negotiation and settlement in order to minimize expenses. The only
detriment likely to arise from dropping the voluntariness requirement would be the
increased possibility of insubstantial or frivolous petitions; however, the suggested
promulgation of clarified guidelines for the determination of the substantiality of
issues would mitigate the deleterious effect of such petitions. See text accompanying
note 56 supra. Therefore, when the Commission next faces this problem, see note
18 supra, or the issue is raised on review before the courts, the proper resolution
should be an absolute requirement of reimbursement when a relicense is granted
pursuant to an agreement settling substantial issues raised by petitioners to deny.
59. The Commission summarized its position as follows:
Promotion of [the public interest standard], with respect to competing chal-
lenges to renewal applicants, calls for the balancing of two obvious consid-
erations. The first is that the public receive the benefits of the statutory
spur inherent in the fact that there can be a challenge, and indeed, where
the public interest so requires, that the new applicant be preferred. The
second is that the comparative hearing policy in this area must not under-
mine predictability and stability of broadcast operation. Policy Statement
on Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants, supra
note 27, at 424-25.
The Commission saw two basic reasons for requiring stability in the broadcast in-
dustry: (1) there is a large investment involved in establishing and operating a
station; and (2) if the relicensing is frequently denied, opportunistic entrepreneurs
may seek licenses with the intention of maximizing short-term profits, by giving
poor service at a minimum investment, with the expectation that the license will
not be renewed. Id.
60. Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201 (D.C. Cir. 1971),
noted in 1971 Duke Project 182, concerned a 1970 FCC policy statement, Policy
Statement Concerning Comparative Hearings Involving Regular Renewal Applicants,
supra note 27, which established license renewal procedures extremely favorable to
renewal applicants. Under the FCC guidelines, if the licensee could show that his
performance had substantially met the needs and interests of his broadcasting area,
his license would be renewed irrespective of the qualifications of competing appli-
cants. According to the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals, this policy
virtually immunized the licensee from competition:
Even more important perhaps is the deadening effect the Policy Statement
has had since its institution upon renewal challengers generally. ...
mhe Policy Statement in a sense is self-executing and . . . has in fact
served to deter the filing of a single competing application for a television
renewal in over a year. . . . 447 F.2d at 1206.
The court, in holding that this policy violated the Congressional mandate to the
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have repeatedly rejected this position and instead have substituted
guidelines which would encourage public and competitor participa-
tion in the license renewal process.6" Recognizing that both the judi-
ciary and the agency profess to be striving for the same goal-fur-
therance of the public interest03-the question of whether the public
interest will be better served by increasing stability or by increasing
public participation at the agency level is one that perhaps cannot
be answered in the piecemeal fashion necessitated by judicial re-
view of individual agency decisions. This fundamental difference
of approach could more properly be settled by legislative clarification
of the public's role in the relicensing process.
FCC, attempted to reduce the "operational bias in favor of incumbent licensees."
Id. at 1207.
61. In Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC,
359 F.2d 994 (D.C. Cir. 1966), the questions presented to the court were: whether
listeners or viewers of a station should be granted standing as "parties in interest" to
contest the renewal of a broadcast station license. In the event the listeners had
standing, the Commission was required to conduct an evidentiary hearing on their
claims prior to acting on renewal of the license. Id. at 997. The Court of Ap-
peals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed the Commjssion's denial of
standing to public petitioners and remanded for a full evidentiary hearing. Id. at
1005. Thus the court opted for increased public participation in relicensing chal-
lenges.
Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v. FCC, 425 F.2d
543 (D.C. Cir. 1969), presented the issue of whether the Commission was correct
in determining that aggrieved listening or viewing groups must carry "the entire
burden of showing that the licensee was not qualified to be granted a renewal."
Id. at 549. The court severely criticized the Commission's attitude toward the
local groups and the treatment of their complaints:
We did not intend that intervenors representing a public interest be
treated as interlopers. Rather, if analogues can be useful, a "Public Inter-
venor" who is seeking no license or private right is, in this context, more
nearly like a complaining witness who presents evidence to police or a
prosecutor [the Commission] whose duty it is to conduct an affirmative and
objective investigation. . . . Id. at 546.
The court in Church II went on to place the burden of proof squarely upon the
licensee. Id. at 550; see 83 HARv. L. REv. 1412 (1970). By doing so, the court
increased the significance of a consumer's petition to deny in the license renewal
process.
62. See 465 F.2d 519, 528; 425 F.2d 543, 549-50; 359 F.2d 994, 1005.
63. Compare, e.g., Office of Communication of the United Church of Christ v.
FCC, 465 F.2d 519, 528 (D.C. Cir. 1972) with KCMC, Inc., 25 F.C.C.2d 603, 604-05;
Citizens Communications Center v. FCC, 447 F.2d 1201, (D.C. Cir. 1971) 1214 with
Policy Statement Concerning Comparative Hearing Involving Regular Renewal
Applicants, 22 F.C.C.2d 424, 424-25 (1970).
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